First Page Preview. Close Modal. You do not currently have access to this article. You could not be signed in. Librarian Administrator Sign In. Buy This Article. Email alerts Article activity alert. Early publications alert. New issue alert. View Full GeoRef Record. Citing articles via Web of Science This site uses cookies. By continuing to use our website, you are agreeing to our privacy policy. Thus, when philosopher of science William Whewell introduced in the dichotomy between catastrophists and uniformitarians, he was not accusing catastrophists of questioning the validity of actual causes as later uniformitarians would.
The argument was instead about the adequacy of observed rates of these causes to explain the rock record Rudwick , However, the nature and validity of actualism as a method remains a topic that needs to be addressed. Another problem in understanding actualism is the tendency of some geologists to confuse it with uniformity. There are significant differences between geologic processes and physicochemical causes.
Although theoretical works for example, Julien predict some geological processes based on principles of physics or chemistry, the rock record is too complex to allow comprehensive explanation in this fashion.
For example, all eruptions obey physical principles regarding interactions between heat, pressure, density, viscosity, and flow dynamics, but the application of these principles to individual eruptions can be very difficult.
Eruptions range from small Kilauea basalt flows to giant explosive events like Tambora, and the resulting rock record of each is quite different. Likewise, sedimentary particles in water, air, or ice follow principles of flow dynamics, but the many rapidly-changing variables grain size, shape, flow depth, velocity, bottom effects, etc.
Groundwater flow models can work well in controlled conditions, but no modeler would claim to be able to predict the motion of each particle of water in a real aquifer Bredehoeft So although there is a clear relationship between uniformity and actualism, as between physicochemical processes and geological processes, the relationship is not univocal.
This lack of evidence is exacerbated by the partial preservation of the rock record. Because secular geologists affirm that most of all the rocks ever deposited are absent, usually by erosion, it would not be possible to reconstruct a comprehensive geologic history even if geologists possessed the ability to accurately explain every rock body available to observation.
And, of course, only a small percentage of the rock record has been directly observed. The confidence of Lyell and his followers was predicated on their mistaken idea that geology was as definitive as Newtonian physics. Laudan , pp. Instead, he argued that geologists should adopt the scientific methods advocated by Newton, for only in this way could geology achieve the status of sciences like astronomy and mechanics.
Lyell also wanted to develop a geological theory with impeccable methodological credentials. So not only must actualism be distinguished from gradualism, but it must be shown not to be an outmoded or arbitrary assumption of method. The essential question then becomes: how do we justify actualism as a fundamental doctrine of modern geology?
Secular geologists interpret the rock record by analogy with observed geological processes. But how do they know? If no justification can be offered, then the entire edifice of uniformitarianism will lie in shambles, with all of its four facets discredited. Secular thinkers have typically taken one of two paths to justify actualism: 1 an appeal to an underlying uniformity of nature for example, Gould , or 2 an appeal to experience for example, Simpson The first path has several flaws.
First, uniformity and actualism are not univocal. Second, the question of how uniformity is justified must then be raised. Thus, an appeal to uniformity only changes the question; it does not answer it. The second path is clearly fallacious. The limited and uncertain observations of a few years cannot be validly extrapolated across billions. Neocatastrophism presents another barrier to the empirical appeal.
A static world is amenable to extrapolation from an observed present, but a dynamic earth increases unpredictability as preserved strata are less representative of the past as a whole. Actualism permeates geohistorical theory.
Core disciplines such as stratigraphy, paleontology, tectonics, and geochronology all rely on actualism. As far back as the 17th century, Steno proposed that his principle of superposition could apply to the entire rock record based on his single observation in the Bay of Naples. That thinking was actualistic. Today, the assumption that crustal plate motions have occurred throughout earth history relies on actualism, as does the idea that modern sedimentary environments are represented in ancient rocks.
If actualism cannot be justified, large parts of the earth sciences would be open to question. Logically, there are three possible answers to the question of whether actualism can be justified: 1 actualism cannot be justified, 2 actualism can be justified within the current framework of earth history, or 3 actualism can be justified, but only by modifying that framework.
The first or third options will have a profound effect on contemporary geohistory and biohistory. Since actualism cannot be justified empirically, it must be justified by logical truth tests.
This process entails three steps:. Actualism can be self-evidently true or it can be true by reference to another proven principle. Because actualism is an axiom of method for materialist earth history, it must be universal in the physical world. So what is actualism? At root, it is a statement about cause and effect. It links a set of causes—observed geologic processes—to consequent effects, defined as features of the rock record. How can the validity of that link be affirmed, especially since our knowledge of the effects the rock record is poor, due to problems in observing the entire entity, to incomplete preservation, and to diagenetic or metamorphic changes?
Is actualism self-evident? Furthermore, I am unaware of any author claiming this status for actualism. Most scholarly efforts to justify it do so by reference to the principle of uniformity for example, see Gould , This logical relationship—actualism as a subset of uniformity—makes sense because the two ideas are similar, but it does not completely answer the question because the two principles are not the same.
But that relationship can be explored as a means by which to better understand how to justify actualism. If uniformity is a precondition of actualism, then actualism is contingent on uniformity and before actualism can be justified, uniformity must first be shown to be true.
Drilling down through concepts to get to the root of the issue moves us to causal continuity. Starting at the top, we ask how to justify actualism.
That takes us to uniformity middle and finally to causal continuity bottom , which is the foundational principle. But how do we know? Uniformity is not absolute. It too is contingent, and rests on the proposition that there exists an unbreakable chain of cause and effect in the physical world across time. Actualism demands uniformity and uniformity demands the validity of the underlying principle of the continuity of cause and effect.
Is it enough to simply affirm cause and effect and consider uniformity and actualism justified too? If we know that cause and effect is universal, then the uniformity of physical and chemical processes may be a valid corollary. If uniformity is universal, then perhaps actualism can be justified by reference to it. But since causal continuity and uniformity are thus both necessary preconditions of actualism, then if neither is valid, then actualism cannot be justified.
Only a few secular thinkers have attempted a logical analysis for example, Hooykaas ; , but his positivist view of knowledge prevented them from moving to the metaphysical level.
Hooykaas never discussed the links between uniformity and causal continuity; he assumed them valid a priori. But was that a valid assumption?
For the sake of argument, let us assume that none of the ideas are valid a priori. Instead, let us attempt to justify the most basic level of causal continuity, recognizing that the validity of both uniformity and actualism would be called into question if this more fundamental principle could not be confidently affirmed. If we cannot validate causality and uniformity, then no amount of empirical evidence can save actualism.
Having climbed down the steps to the foundation, we must then move back up, carrying validation back up through the sequence. Having defined the questions fig.
In this case, the test of coherence is appropriate. That is because the assertion of actualism is not made in a vacuum, but in the context of a worldview. Inconsistencies would indicate a failure of the test of coherence. This test provides two logical checks. The first is the validation of the fundamental principle of causal continuity. The second checks the basis for deriving uniformity. Rational people understand that the principle of causality, like that of contradiction, is a prerequisite of truth.
Since science is the pursuit of truth in the natural realm, then causality is also crucial to science. If an effect can occur spontaneously without cause, empirical predictability is not absolute.
Of the two possible answers justifying the doctrines of causal continuity, uniformity, and actualism, only Christianity provides the consistent tenets to do so. There are two possible ways to justify causal continuity fig. Both return a positive result, but one way is less rigorous and satisfying.
The first method is to treat causality as a pure axiom. But saying that causal continuity is necessary Answer 1 in fig. In other words, we accept causal continuity because rational knowledge and practical living are not possible without it. For example, we rest our life on the causal continuity between stepping on the brake and the car stopping.
In a negative sense, this perhaps justifies causality; we cannot imagine it not being true. But is there a better answer? The second option provides one by going one step further and providing a positive coherence with metaphysical reality. That method may seem strange to our positivist culture, but it is certainly better than the first option.
Statements about ultimate being and reality are found in worldviews. The two worldviews relevant to this discussion are orthodox Christianity and Enlightenment secularism that is, Naturalism. Each makes distinct metaphysical assertions that can be used to evaluate the legitimacy of the axiom of causal continuity. Christianity answer 2 in fig. God is rational, unified, and unchanging, thus continuity of cause and effect is assured.
God is eternal, and so causal continuity is operative everywhere in time. God is infinite, so cause and effect applies everywhere. Causal continuity exists in the material realm because the cosmos is the contingent creation of God, and His creation manifests His attributes. But there is one important distinction in the Christian position—absolute causal continuity exists in the person of God, not in the physical creation. In contrast, the worldview of Naturalism fails at this point because its metaphysical materialism demands that absolute causal continuity be found in matter or energy.
That proposition is contradicted by any beginning for the universe Reed and Williams, in press. It does not matter what kind of origin or how long ago it occurred; any origin represents a discontinuity in material cause and effect which in turn disallows a materialist rationale for causal continuity, and thus for uniformity and actualism.
Another conflict is found in the epistemological realm. Reed noted that uniformitarianism and positivism—the epistemology of Naturalism—are also incompatible because uniformitarianism cannot be validated by empirical data.
Neither uniformity nor causal continuity can be justified empirically, therefore Naturalism fails the test again with its restrictive epistemology. Although widely unrecognized as such, this axiomatic failure of the truth test of coherence is the fundamental crisis of modern natural history because it precludes uniformity and its derivative actualism. How did this come about and why is it so widely unrecognized?
That is a question for professional philosophers of science, but one possible explanation is that geology like other aspects of Enlightenment knowledge was built on a secular foundation, but one that unconsciously embedded various Christian concepts already accepted as presuppositions of science Lisle ; Reed It is ironic that the same geologists who were accepting these axioms, such as linear, progressive time, were at the same time vociferously attacking historical tenets of Christianity.
Even those who were Christians for example, Buckland and Sedgwick dismissed the Genesis account, not recognizing the stunning inconsistency in their position. If Naturalism cannot justify causal continuity or uniformity, then it cannot possibly justify actualism. Yet geohistory rests on the mistaken assumption that it has already done so. The positivism of the secular worldview elevates science above theology and first-order philosophy, blinding thinkers to first-order problems of the nature of reality and the necessity of knowing it through theology and philosophy, not science.
Even Christians in the modern age have been influenced by culture; theological truth seems out of place in the scientific realm. By failing to ask the appropriate questions about the nature of their own axioms, natural historians cannot possibly provide the correct answers. This is illustrated by the long-time emphasis on the tempo of the past instead of the basis for the method of deriving it.
Thus, actualism can be justified, but only within the framework of Christianity. But that creates another problem of consistency. Because Christianity also speaks to ancient history and to the beginnings of the cosmos, consistency demands that the framework of natural history be aligned with the biblical narrative.
The last question will be answered first. If actualism is derived from uniformity, and if uniformity is derived from causal continuity, and if causal continuity is validated by the nature of God, then all three concepts are only justified by Christianity.
Absolute causal continuity can only exist in a being who is also absolute. Based on information God has revealed about how He created and governs the cosmos, we can expect continuity of cause and effect, uniformity, and even actualism to be valid tools in examining the natural world. Since the metaphysical and historical frameworks that underlie natural history must be those of Christianity, then propositions contrary to Christianity must be abandoned.
This entails sweeping changes in the way both uniformity and actualism are understood. As noted earlier, most secular thinkers predicate actualism on the prior principle of uniformity.
But if all three principles are validated only by Christianity, then none of them are absolute. That creates another problem, because secular thinkers treat uniformity as absolute. What are the consequences of having to change that view? That is the argument for scientific naturalism and has been for several centuries. It is claimed that science is impossible in a world governed by divine caprice.
But that raises the question of how science originated in the Christian worldview. The answer to the problem is that secularists make a logical error: they conflate the need for science to be absolute with the need for it to be true.
The latter does not demand the former. In theory, since causal continuity is justified by Christianity, then there is a God who created and governs the cosmos. Secularists see this as a problem. However, their unspoken assumption is materialism. But how can God not act upon what He has made?
The issue is not one of science, but of theology. Thus, both logically and historically, science and a theology of divine providence are not at odds. Both philosophy and theology have special terms to refer to causality and providence. Different terms can refer to different aspects of the same thing. Christians have been confused by secular attacks because they have ignored their legacy of theology and allowed the secular scientific view—which is materialistic or deistic—to direct their thinking.
Plantinga , p. Secularists fail to see the issue theologically, and, in doing so, they fail to see that God can and does also work immediately. We often call His immediate acts miracles, set apart from actions of providence involving secondary causes fig. This assumes a deistic view which grants the power of continuing existence to matter and energy, making uniformity a material property rather than a divine act.
The view which we have called "actualism" is sometimes perhaps more commonly known as uniformitarianism. However, this word is often misleading. As a term in the history of science, it often refers to ideas some of which no living geologist considers to be true.
And as a term in religious apologetics, it often refers to ideas which no geologist in the entire history of geology has ever considered to be true. For that reason, in this text I have thought it best to retire the old word and go with the more modern term "actualism" instead.
The term "uniformitarianism" is misleading in itself: for when modern geologists call themselves uniformitarians, what are they claiming to be uniform? No less than the laws of nature themselves — but not necessarily anything else. Every geologist will insist that many things have not been uniform over the course of the Earth's history: its flora and fauna , for example, have not stayed the same; its temperature has not stayed the same; the composition of its atmosphere has not stayed the same; the arrangement of continents has not stayed the same; the global climate has not stayed the same.
What has apparently stayed the same is that throughout all this change the laws of nature have been uniformly unbroken, and only actual processes have taken place. In modern parlance, a "uniformitarian" geologist asserts no more than that; he or she has no general belief in uniformity , merely in actualism. From Wikibooks, open books for an open world. Category : Book:Historical Geology. Namespaces Book Discussion. Views Read Edit Edit source View history.
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