Unable to see and increasingly unable to breathe due to the billowing, black smoke, patrons stumbled over dining room furniture, frantically searching for a way out of the danger. A second outlet, consisting of an inward-opening door, effectively became a wall as the panicked crowd pushed forth in an attempt to flee to the streets.
Additional exits, if they could be located in the dark, were either blocked or obscured, leaving hundreds trapped within the inferno, desperately hoping for outside rescuers to break through the barriers. Causes of death were mainly due to asphyxiation and extreme burns sustained from the fire.
The duty log from the U. View in National Archives Catalog. Boston firefighting units had responded to the Grove just moments after the blaze began, and, almost as quickly, realized the severe, life-threatening nature of the fire and the dire need for additional resources to combat it. At p. They raced the approximate 3. Many other military stations within the city and in the surrounding region also responded and rallied personnel to the scene of the fire.
Among these were the U. Naval Hospital in Chelsea, Massachusetts, which dispatched three ambulances with stretchers, four medical officers, and 12 hospital corpsmen. The U. Individual servicemen, who had been in the neighborhood that evening and observed the situation, responded to provide assistance as well.
Once on scene, these sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen coordinated with city emergency response personnel to provide crowd control in the immediate vicinity of the nightclub alongside Army military police units , to break down building exits, to rescue and care for those injured, and to recover the dead.
They systematically formed stretcher lines to remove victims from the still burning building and to bring them into waiting ambulances for transport to one of the many hospitals throughout the city, or, in the case of the deceased, to one of the two city mortuaries.
The sheriff's office joined the Boston police and fire departments in commending the U. Navy's assistance at the fire and during the recovery. RG , National Archives at Boston. Describing the magnitude of the work being performed by naval personnel, Lt. John J. Reilly of the Naval Shore Patrol recounted that Navy units had removed bodies from the building through one exit alone. Reilly recalled Boston Police Capt. James T. The Navy boys were grand. According to the Administrative History of the First Naval District in World War II, by early , the district comprised approximately 17, enlisted men, 4, officers, and tens of thousands of civilian employees stationed at bases and installations throughout its jurisdiction, stretching from Newfoundland to Newport, Rhode Island.
Those who could be transferred to Chelsea Naval Hospital were moved accordingly so that they could receive the Navy medical resources intended for them while also alleviating the strain on civilian hospitals. Similarly, the First District assigned personnel to the city mortuaries in order to identify the bodies of deceased servicemen and to facilitate transfer of their remains to Chelsea Naval Hospital.
District intelligence officers also canvassed the hospitals and mortuaries, as well as the scene of the nightclub itself, to ascertain information that might explain how the fire occurred and why so many had perished. Military caps lay abandoned, a grim reminder of the many victims of the Cocoanut Grove blaze. At the U. Naval Training School located at Harvard College, officers established a call center to facilitate such communication in order to determine the status of unaccounted for trainees and personnel.
One missing officer, Ens. Students at the school informed officers that Bauer had gone to the Cocoanut Grove on Saturday night and feared the worst for him.
On Sunday morning, November 29, the Cocoanut Grove fire dominated the headlines in Boston, and would do so for several days, displacing war updates that normally would have been front page news. Even other big city dailies, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, made room on their front pages to report on the events in Boston. Buck Jones, who did not survive after lingering for two days, was among the victims sent to MGH. Doctors and nurses worked to save the injured, while other personnel worked to identify the victims.
Treatment of burns and internal injuries on such as massive scale caused medical personnel to adopt newly developed methods of care. Some methods had been well tested, while others had not. The first recorded general non-test patients use of penicillin to fight infection on burn victims occurred at MGH on December 2, Oliver Cope, by treating the affected skin areas with a solution of boric petroleum. Purple dyes were used at BCH to coat the skin and to fight infection. Skin grafts were used to help in the healing process.
In all, advances in burn treatment were made in four categories: fluid retention; prevention infection; treating respiratory trauma; skin surface and surgical management. It was discovered that many victims, both at the scene and at the hospital, succumbed to pulmonary edema. In the aftermath of the fire, investigations were conducted by several agencies. Testimony was heard from many witnesses as to the facts surrounding the disaster.
Most believed that the busboy was responsible, but others believed the cause was electrical. A Grand Jury would later indict ten persons, but the only person convicted of a crime was the owner, Barney Welansky, on one count of manslaughter.
He was sentence to years in Charlestown State Prison. Due to an advanced cancer condition, he was pardoned by Governor Maurice Tobin after serving 3. He died in , at age 50, several months after his release from prison. Building codes were amended in the city and elsewhere. Revolving doors were outlawed later reinstated when a revolving door is placed between two outward-opening exit doors.
Exit doors were to be clearly marked, be unlocked from within, and free from blockage by screen, drapes, furniture or business supplies. Use of non-combustible decorations and building materials was ordered, as was the placement of emergency lighting and sprinklers. The final death count established by Commissioner Reilly was dead and injured.
The number of injured was a count of those treated at a hospital and later released. Many other patrons were injured but did not seek hospitalization. As the years went by, the recognized number of fatalities became Also, the attacks September 11, on the World Trade Center in New York killed approximately 2, persons, but the event was a combination fire and collapse event. The lessons of the Cocoanut Grove are with us every day. Exits blocked or locked, smoking and use of matches, overcrowding, flammable materials within buildings and a lack of sprinklers and smoke detectors.
The answer is yes, it can and will happen again. Many of the same causes and lessons experienced at the Cocoanut Grove caused this tragedy. The site of the Cocoanut Grove has been dramatically changed over the years since Broadway now only runs two blocks from Melrose Street to Piedmont Street.
The hotel now covers most of the land area where the Cocoanut Grove stood. A bronze memorial plaque was placed in the brick sidewalk in by the Bay Village Neighborhood Association and a marker was placed on the wall of the hotel by the Bostonian Society.
A number of books, research studies, and literary articles have been written about the Cocoanut Grove Fire over the years. Those on hand grabbed axes to break windows. But it was chaotic. The street was also filled with police, servicemen, and civilians.
US Naval reserveman Nick Pagonis said in a police interview, which was publicly released in , "It seemed to me that all those rescue workers were in the way. They held back those who wanted to help. The whole picture was very disgusting.
Some did get out. But in the panic, people were separated from loved ones. A year-old man named Clifford Johnson lost sight of his date as he was pushed into the open. He went back inside four times to try and save her, before he collapsed, covered in horrific burns. Some escaped through side doors, or climbed to the roof. According to the Baltimore Sun, two chorus girls jumped from the roof and were caught by two male dancers.
Others survived by wetting handkerchiefs and covering their mouths. Daniel Weiss, one of the cashiers, covered his mouth with a soaked bar towel, and stayed close the ground. In little over an hour, the fire was out. Bodies were passed through the charred windows to waiting soldiers and sailors.
It was so cold outside, below freezing, that puddles from the fire hoses froze over. An AP correspondent wrote, "When the last body was reported out I looked around the room of the ground floor.
It was a shambles. Chairs and tables were upended, crockery and glassware was strewn everywhere, it was as if a tornado had whistled through the room. By midnight, the Cocoanut Grove was a charred, empty building.
Despite what had happened within, the structure survived. The Sun called it a "huge brick oven," with little obvious damage to its walls and roof. A priest administered last rites. Those still alive were sent to two nearby hospitals, Boston City and Massachusetts General. BCH got over casualties, of which lived longer than two hours. MGH got , of which 39 survived longer than two hours. At MGH, it was a quiet evening until ambulances arrived, one after another.
Surgical register Francis Moore wrote a letter to his parents about the night. He described one young girl "with her clothes burned off, and her skin hanging like ribbons as she flailed her arms around, screaming with pain. The next day, cars were still parked down the road. Firemen hosed down the narrow cobbled street, washing away cups and saucers, women's clothing, and hundreds of cocktail forks.
Newspapers in the days after called it a "holocaust. Because of the scope of the burns, identifying victims was difficult. Police went through notebooks and purses to identify who had died. But it took days to sort out who had perished and who had survived. Some people were never identified. Friends and relatives of missing people filled an amphitheater at a mortuary as they waited to try and identify victims.
Within 24 hours, legislators had filed for bills to strengthen laws around fire protection and building inspections. Four days after the fire, regulations had already changed in St. One of the biggest impacts the fire had was on treating burn patients. They also did skin grafts. These techniques were used later to treat wounded soldiers.
But the recovery process for some took months or years. In May , eight people were still recovering in the hospital. This photo shows him exercising in September , about 10 months after the fire. Johnson was discharged on November 26, , nearly a year after the fire. He was the last victim to leave the hospital. Investigations soon began to determine who was responsible for the tragedy. In "Fire in the Grove," a book on the event, John C.
Esposito wrote it was like "the foxes investigating the misfortune at the hen house. A month later, 10 people deemed responsible for the tragedy were charged. They included the building commissioner, the club builder, the building inspector, and Welansky.
Welansky was convicted of 19 counts of involuntary manslaughter, which set a legal precedent that someone could be guilty by consciously failing to fix dangerous conditions.
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